In service: 10-8 Vol.5: Iss.2, 2005 by Justice Institute of British Columbia (Justice Institute of British Columbia) (Author)
POLICE ACADEMY 
715 McBride Blvd. New Westminster B.C. V3L 5T4 
IN SERVICE:10-8 
A PEER READ PUBLICATION 
 
A newsletter devoted to operational police officers across British Columbia. 
Volume 5 Issue 2  
March/April 2005 
 
IN MEMORIAL 
 
On March 2, 2005, two 
members of the RCMP 
attended a rural residence 
outside of Mayerthorpe, 
Alberta to keep the peace 
and assist with a court 
order seizure of property. 
As a result of their attendance, evidence was 
obtained which resulted in a search warrant 
being sworn and secured for a marihuana grow 
operation.  
 
In the morning of March 3, 2005, two uniform 
members were left to secure the property until 
Edmonton RCMP Auto Theft Unit members 
attended the location to conduct a search of the 
property for stolen goods. Two additional 
uniform members later attended the residence. 
At 9:15 a.m., two members of the Edmonton 
RCMP Auto Theft Unit arrived at the residence 
and heard shots being fired inside a quonset hut 
on the property. A male suspect exited the 
quonset and fired a number of shots at the Auto 
Theft members, who returned fire. The male was 
in possession of a rapid fire auto carbine assault 
style rifle and retreated inside the quonset. 
Members of Edmonton and Red Deer Emergency 
Response Teams were immediately deployed 
along with other Support Units.  
 
Constable Peter Schiemann, Constable Anthony 
Gordon, Constable Lionide (Leo) Johnston, and 
Constable Brock Myrol were located inside the 
quonset, and appeared to have succumbed to 
gunshot wounds. A male suspect was also 
deceased within the same building.  
 
 
 
“They are our heroes.  
We shall not forget them.”1 
 
RCMP 
Constable Peter Schiemann 
Age: 25 
Service: 4 years 
 
 
 
 
RCMP 
Constable Anthony Gordon 
Age: 28 
Service: 2 years 
 
 
 
 
RCMP 
Constable Lionide Johnston 
Age: 32 
Service: 4 years 
 
 
 
 
RCMP 
Constable Brock Myrol 
Age: 29 
Service: 1 year 
 
 
 
The preceding information was provided with the 
permission of the Officer Down Memorial Page: 
available at www.odmp.org/Canada. 
                                                 
1 Inscription on Canadian Police and Peace Officer Memorial—Parliament Buildings 
Ottawa, Ontario. 
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‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
Once again, the “In 
Service:10-8” newsletter 
would like to share some 
of our readers’ comments 
about the publication.  
************ 
“I first learned about this publication three 
years ago. I share this publication with all the 
members who care about their job and those who 
strive to be a better member”—Major Crime 
Constable, RCMP British Columbia 
************ 
“We really need this type of updating on a 
regular basis. Without it we are going to have 
problems in court”—Police Constable, British 
Columbia  
************ 
“Keep up the good work. I really like the fact 
that In Service is put together in an easy to 
read and understand style. It is a must read 
every time a new issue comes out and an 
excellent resource that all officers should 
read”—Police Constable, Manitoba 
 
All past editions of this 
newsletter are available online 
by clicking on the Police 
Academy link at:  
www.jibc.bc.ca 
 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
on Plain View—[T]he officer did not have to 
avert his eyes and pretend, like Sergeant Shultz 
in the television show, "Hogan's Heroes", that he 
"knows nothing".  That would make a mockery of 
effective police enforcement.  Provided he 
comes across the evidence inadvertently and 
what he observes is immediately apparent as 
evidence of a probable crime, he may 
immediately seize the material—NFCA Justice 
Green2
                                                 
2 R. v .Robere, (1999) Docket: 97/102 (NFCA)   
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B.C. METH DEATHS RISE 
 
A recent report issued by 
British Columbia’s Chief 
Coroner shows 2004 deaths 
in which methamphetamine 
was present in toxicology 
results has more than 
doubled since 2003. In 2000 there were only 
three methamphetamine death cases, while in 
2004 that figure had risen to 33.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the 65 deaths over the last five years in 
which the presence of methamphetamine was 
found, 52 were male while 13 were female.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Metro region had the most deaths at 28, 
followed by the Fraser (20), the Interior (8), 
the Island (5) and the North (4) regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For more information go to www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/ 
coroners. 
 
2004 POLICE STATS UNVEILED 
 
Statistics Canada has 
recently released its 2004 
policing statistics. In 
2004, there were a total 
of 59,906 police officers 
across Canada. Ontario had the most cops with 
23,214 while the Yukon had the least with 121. 
 
Province Cops % of Total 
Ontario 23,214 38.8% 
Quebec 14,411 23.5% 
British Columbia 7,193 12.0% 
Alberta 5,123 8.5% 
Manitoba 2,266 3.7% 
Saskatchewan 2,010 3.3% 
Nova Scotia 1,615 2.7% 
New Brunswick 1,302 2.1% 
Newfoundland 766 1.3% 
Prince Edward Island 207 0.3% 
Northwest Territories 171 0.2% 
Nunavut 123 0.2% 
Yukon 121 0.2% 
RCMP HQ & Training Academy 1,384 2.3% 
 
The 2004 population per police officer statistics 
were also revealed. In Canada there were, on 
average, 533.3 residents to every police officer. 
Nunavut had the lowest ratio at 241 residents to 
every cop while Newfoundland had the highest at 
675 residents.  
 
Province Pop per Cop 
Nunavut 241.0 
Northwest Territories 250.4 
Yukon 257.9 
Saskatchewan 495.2 
Manitoba 516.4 
Quebec 523.4 
Ontario 533.8 
New Brunswick 577.1 
Nova Scotia 580.2 
British Columbia 583.4 
Alberta 625.0 
Prince Edward Island 666.0 
Newfoundland 675.0 
Canada 533.3 
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The population per police officer ratio for 
Canada’s 27 Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs), 
a Statistic’s Canada defined geographic area 
with a population in excess of 100,000, showed 
Regina with the lowest population per police 
officer ratio at 483 residents per cop while 
Abbotsford had the highest at 777.  
 
 
CMA Pop per Cop 
Regina 483 
Thunder Bay 503 
Saskatoon 554 
Winnipeg 559 
Toronto 579 
Montreal 582 
Windsor 599 
St Catherines-Niagara 630 
Trois-Rivieres 641 
Edmonton 654 
Calgary 655 
Halifax 668 
Victoria 670 
Greater Sudbury 684 
Hamilton 688 
Gatineau 694 
Saguenay 698 
Vancouver 704 
Kitchener 709 
St Johns 723 
Saint John 724 
Quebec 728 
Kingston 739 
Sherbrooke 740 
London 744 
Ottawa 751 
Abbotsford 777 
Canada 533.3 
 
Note: A CMA is not necessarily restricted to its 
namesake and includes other areas. For example, 
police services included in the Vancouver CMA 
are Bowen Island (RCMP), Burnaby (RCMP), 
Coquitlam (RCMP), Delta, Langley (RCMP), Maple 
Ridge (RCMP) New Westminster, North 
Vancouver (RCMP), Pitt Meadows (RCMP), Port 
Coquitlam (RCMP), Port Moody, Richmond (RCMP), 
Squamish (RCMP), Surrey (RCMP), Vancouver, 
West Vancouver, and White Rock (RCMP). 
 
For more information go to www.statcan.ca 
ONTARIO FIRST NATIONS 
CONSTABLES MAY SET UP 
R.I.D.E. OFF RESERVE 
R. v. Decorte, 2005 SCC 9 
 
Two Anishinabek Police Service 
First Nation constables 
stopped the accused shortly 
before 1:00 am at a drinking 
and driving checkpoint (R.I.D.E. 
program) just outside the Fort William Reserve 
in Ontario. The accused had an odour of alcohol 
on his breath and refused to provide a breath 
sample. As well, he was also in breach of a 
recognizance requiring him to refrain from 
consuming alcohol and to remain in an alcohol 
free residence between 4:00 pm and 10:00 am. 
He was arrested and charged with refusing to 
provide a breath sample and breaching his 
recognizance. 
 
At his trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the 
accused was acquitted of the refusal charge but 
convicted of the recognizance breach, which was 
affirmed on appeal by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. He launched a further appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada arguing he was 
arbitrarily detained in violation of s.9 of the 
Charter and that the evidence should have been 
excluded under s.24(2). In his view, the First 
Nations officers were not allowed to set up a 
R.I.D.E. operation under s.48 of Ontario’s 
Highway Traffic Act (HTA) because they were 
outside their reserve territory and were not 
“peace officers” for the purpose of the breath 
demand section in the Criminal Code.  
 
A unanimous Supreme Court of Canada rejected 
the accused’s appeal. The jurisdiction of the 
constables was determined by statute, 
regulation, and service agreement. Although the 
First Nations constables were not “police 
officers” within the meaning of Ontario’s Police 
Services Act (PSA), the PSA nonetheless 
attributed them the “powers of a police officer” 
for the purpose of carrying out their specified 
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duties—such as preventing crime, preserving the 
peace, preventing accidents, and apprehending 
offenders—which are similar to the PSA duties 
of police officers.  
 
Furthermore the constables were not confined 
to the territorial limits of their First Nation 
community. They were appointed by the 
Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police “to 
act as First Nations Constables for the Province 
of Ontario…for the purpose of performing law 
enforcement functions in Ontario”. In addition, 
the Anishinabek Police Service Agreement 
provided for the exercise of police powers in and 
for Ontario, while their oath of office refers to 
the discharge of their duties in Ontario. As well, 
their identification certificate stated they were 
empowered to exercise their authority in 
Ontario. Thus, the First Nations constables were 
empowered to discharge their policing duties 
outside their Nation’s Territory anywhere in 
Ontario in relation to the First Nation’s 
communities they were employed primarily to 
serve.  
 
Since the constables were also peace officers as 
defined in s.2(c) of the Criminal Code and were 
authorized to set up the R.I.D.E. operation under 
s.48 of the HTA, which allows police officers to 
randomly stop drivers to determine whether or 
not there is evidence for demanding a breath 
sample under s.254 of the Criminal Code, the 
detention was authorized by law and passed 
constitutional muster. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed and his earlier conviction upheld.  
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
on Implied Licence—Can it rationally be 
asserted that I give an implied licence to a 
burglar to come to my front door for the 
purpose of "casing" my house? To the 
householder unlawfully cultivating, the policeman 
is no more welcome than the burglar is to me—
BCCA Justice Southin3 
                                                 
3 R. v. Evans, (1994) 93 CCC (3d) 130 (BCCA) 
PLAIN VIEW JUSTIFIES 
SEIZURE OF ITEMS NOT 
LISTED IN WARRANT 
R. v. Pham, 
(2005) Docket:C40282 (OntCA) 
 
Following a break and enter to 
his jukebox and novelty company 
in which 11 slot machines were 
stolen, the owner noticed an 
advertisement in a newspaper advertising a slot 
machine for sale. His friend attended the 
address and saw a slot machine in a storefront 
that was similar to the one stolen. The owner 
then also attended the store, met with the 
accused and recognized two of his stolen slot 
machines. The owner called police. 
 
A detective prepared a telewarrant application 
and was granted a search warrant authorizing 
the search of the storefront between 11:30 pm 
and 4:00 am for two slot machines and two serial 
number plates. The police executed the warrant 
shortly before 1:00 am. and realized that the 
building contained both a residence and a store. 
They entered to secure the entire building for 
officer safety and to preserve evidence. The 
police found and seized two slot machines and 
located other stolen property that was seized. A 
second search four days later also uncovered 
more stolen property.  
 
The accused was convicted at trial in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice on 11 charges of 
possession of stolen property under $5000 and 
one count of possession of stolen property over 
$5000 after the trial judge ruled the searches 
did not violate s.8 of the Charter. However, the 
accused appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing, among other grounds, that there was no 
basis for the nighttime search, that the search 
was unreasonable, and that he had been 
arbitrarily detained. 
 
The unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal rejected 
these arguments. First, the accused had told the 
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owner that he had been receiving many calls 
about the slot machine and one was advertised in 
the weekend newspaper. The trial judge found 
that the police were concerned with the 
fluidness of the stolen goods business and he 
was reluctant to second-guess their knowledge in 
this area. The nighttime search was not 
unreasonable. 
 
Nor were the procedural steps taken by the 
police unreasonable. Their notification and entry 
was appropriate. Furthermore, the items seized 
that were not listed in the search warrant were 
validly seized on the basis of reasonable grounds 
to believe that they were stolen goods. They 
were in plain view as part of the continuing 
search for the serial plates, which were listed in 
the search warrant. 
 
Finally, the accused was not arbitrarily detained 
under s.9 of the Charter. Once the police 
located the first stolen slot machine, his arrest 
was proper.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
NO RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR 
ROADSIDE DETAINEE 
R. v. White, 2005 NSCA 32 
 
A police officer approached a 
driver that had tried to avoid 
him and had parked against a 
snow bank. The officer 
requested the accused’s driver’s 
licence and noted she had difficultly finding it. 
She admitted to drinking, her eyes were 
bloodshot, and there was a moderate odour of 
liquor in the car. A roadside screening demand 
was read and after five tries at providing a 
sample, the accused was told she would be 
charged with refusal. The officer completed the 
necessary paperwork and drove the accused 
home.  
 
At her trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of refusing to provide a 
breath sample contrary to s.254(5) of the 
Criminal Code. However, she appealed to the 
Nova Scotia Supreme Court contending, among 
other grounds, that her s.10(b) Charter rights 
had been violated. This appeal was dismissed, but 
the accused appealed further to the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal. The accused argued that she 
was entitled to be informed of her right to 
counsel both before the roadside test and after 
it was completed.  
 
Justice Chipman, authoring the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal judgment, ruled that the lower 
court did not err. First, even though a driver 
who is subject to a roadside demand is detained 
for Charter purposes, the legislation justifies a 
limitation on the individual’s constitutional right 
to a lawyer provided the sample is taken 
forthwith. Second, “it was also clear that any 
issue of Charter rights after the roadside test 
was completed was not relevant to the refusal 
charge.” The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
POST DRIVING CONDUCT IS 
EVIDENCE OF IMPAIRMENT 
R. v. Smith, 2005 NLCA 1 
 
The accused was convicted of 
impaired driving in the Provincial 
Court of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, but appealed to the 
Newfoundland and Labrador 
Court of Appeal contending that evidence of his 
behaviour after his car was stopped could not be 
used to support a conclusion that his ability to 
operate a motor vehicle was impaired. The 
Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal, 
however, rejected his argument. Justice 
Cameron stated: 
 
The indicia of impairment evident by the 
observations of the [accused] by the police 
officer are admissible as going to the question 
of impairment. Here I refer, for example, to 
such things as slurred speech, blood shot eyes 
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and being unsteady on his feet. There are 
others. 
 
…In this case, on finally stopping his car near a 
pond on his property, the [accused] quickly 
exited the car and threw a beer bottle and the 
car keys into the pond. He then went into the 
boathouse, from where he had a conversation 
with the police officer who was outside the 
boathouse. Next, he left the boathouse and 
hurried into his residence. He was clearly 
trying to avoid the police officer. The trial 
judge demonstrated that he was aware of the 
need for caution in dealing with post offence 
conduct.  He considered the [accused’s] stated 
concern for being found with an open beer 
bottle in his car as the reason for his conduct. 
The trial judge was particularly struck by the 
throwing of the car keys into the pond, for 
which he found no credible explanation. The 
[accused] has not demonstrated an error on 
the part of the trial judge in considering this 
post offence conduct. [para. 7-8] 
 
As the Court noted, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has held that post offence conduct can 
be used as circumstantial evidence of culpability 
and there is no special test for determining 
impairment. In this case there was ample indicia 
of impairment. The appeal was denied. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
COMPLIANCE INSPECTION 
NOT A SEARCH FOR CHARTER 
PURPOSES 
R. v. Diep, 2005 ABCA 54 
 
Conservation officers, whose 
duty it was to ensure 
compliance with the Alberta 
Fisheries Act, received 
information that the accused was keeping 
Bigmouth Buffalo fish on his premises contrary 
to his fish farming licence. When arriving to 
conduct an inspection of the premises, the 
officers saw him exit a quonset building and lock 
it up. When asked, the accused said the 
unheated building contained no fish but was used 
to fabricate fish tanks.  
 
Two other buildings were checked—one 
contained fish he was allowed to farm, the other 
Bigmouth Buffalo fish. He provided a copy of his 
licence, invoices, and other documents related to 
his business. The officers noted heat coming 
from the quonset that the accused said was not 
heated. They decided to inspect this building, 
but could not open the lock even with the 
accused’s apparent assistance. After a locksmith 
arrived to cut the lock, the accused produced a 
key and the officers entered. Inside they saw 
more fish tanks and a marihuana grow operation. 
The accused was arrested and the police were 
called. A search warrant was obtained and 933 
marihuana plants were seized.  
 
The accused was convicted in the Alberta Court 
of Queen’s Bench, but appealed to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal arguing the actions of the 
conservation officers was not an inspection, but 
amounted to a warrantless search that was 
unreasonable under s.8 of the Charter and that 
the evidence should have been excluded under 
s.24(2). In his view, once the officers had 
sufficient evidence to lay a charge, the 
inspection of the final building was a search 
requiring Charter scrutiny, rather than merely a 
compliance inspection.  
 
The Alberta high court ruled that the officers 
were entitled to inspect the premises of a 
licenced fish farm under Alberta’s Fisheries Act. 
As long as the officer’s predominant purpose for 
their enquiry remained the determination of 
statutory compliance—even though they had 
already found a breach of the regulatory 
statute—they could continue their inspection. As 
the Court noted: 
 
Here the officers were seeking to determine 
the extent of the compliance, or more 
appropriately, the lack of compliance of [the 
accused]. They did not initially lay charges 
after their first visit to [the accused’s] 
premises. Their inspection was ongoing and was 
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incomplete because they were not granted 
access to one of the buildings. They had only 
seen 2 of 35 fish tanks for which [the 
accused] had a licence. They had a concern 
that if Bigmouth Buffalo fish were in the 
uninspected building they could be removed 
before any delayed inspection occurred. When 
the officers entered the building they 
concentrated on the tanks and the fish. They 
literally stumbled on the marijuana plants. 
 
The nature of the activity being regulated is 
relevant to both expectation of privacy and 
the need for thorough and complete 
inspections. Fish farming is an industry whose 
purpose is to raise fish for human consumption. 
Its regulation, at a high level, is called for 
because food safety is a critical and pressing 
goal. Inspections necessarily involve a myriad 
of different steps, including inspection for 
species but also for concerns such as general 
cleanliness, health of the fish, disposal of dead 
fish and other waste, temperature controls 
and many other industry concerns. Although 
reasonable and probable grounds may exist to 
lay charges under one section of the Act that 
does not automatically transform an inspection 
into a search. 
 
A second pressing objective of the Act is to 
protect the Alberta ecosystem from the 
contamination of non-native fish species and 
parasites that travel with them. Big mouth 
Buffalo fish, dependant on their place of 
origin, are a known source of a dangerous 
parasite. [paras. 10-12] 
 
The accused’s assertion that he had a high 
expectation of privacy in his out buildings—
similar to that of a residential garage—was also 
rejected. The Court stated: 
 
Buildings in which licenced fish farm activities 
are being carried out do not attract a high 
expectation of privacy. Viewing fish farms as 
equivalent to homes is not a “logical” 
progression that we are prepared to make. 
Furthermore, the operation of a fish farm is 
governed by the licence and the Act. By taking 
a licence [the accused] is agreeing to abide by 
the terms of the licence and the regulatory 
scheme used to enforce it. In the face of this 
agreement any expectation of privacy is 
minimal. [para. 13] 
 
The Alberta Court of Appeal held that the 
officer’s inquiry remained an inspection and 
never became a search. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
TAC UNIT’s AGGRESSIVENESS 
UNREASONABLE 
Crampton v. Walton et al, 2005 ABCA 81 
 
A police drug unit member 
received a tip from a 
confidential informant that a 
marihuana operation was possibly 
being grown at a residence. 
After further investigation the officer formed 
the belief that the residence contained a grow 
operation. He swore an information and obtained 
a search warrant to search for evidence of 
cultivation. He also had some information that 
there was a possibility there might be a weapon 
inside the residence, but it was not sufficient to 
get a firearms search warrant. Because a weapon 
might be present, police protocol required the 
use of the tactical unit. 
 
The tactical unit entered through the plaintiff’s 
unlocked screen door, pointed an assault rifle at 
him, and announced they had a search warrant. 
The plaintiff, who had been making a pickle 
sandwich, was ordered to drop the steak knife 
he was using. Stunned, he hesitated but dropped 
the knife and began to kneel on the ground. A 
tactical officer assisted the accused’s descent 
to the ground and knocked the wind out him. He 
wet himself, bruised his jaw, injured his rotator 
cuff and cracked five ribs. The police had faulty 
intelligence and the wrong suspect—the person 
named in the warrant was not the plaintiff. They 
found no drugs or weapons. 
 
The plaintiff sued the police chief and other 
officers for assault and was awarded $20,000 
by the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench. The 
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police, however, appealed to the Alberta Court 
of Appeal submitting they were protected from 
liability under s.25 of the Criminal Code.  
 
Once a plaintiff establishes they were assaulted 
and sustained an injury, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to justify the assault. Section 25 of 
the Criminal Code protects police officers from 
criminal and civil liability in the course of 
enforcing or administering the law provided they 
act of reasonable grounds and do not use 
unnecessary force. The Court divided the s.25 
analysis into three branches: 
 
1. Were the police required or authorized 
to perform the action? 
2. Did the police act of reasonable grounds? 
3. Did the police use unnecessary force? 
 
Required or Authorized by Law? 
 
In this case, the police obtained a warrant that 
authorized them to enter and search the 
residence for drugs. Although the warrant did 
not authorize them to detain, restrain, or arrest 
the occupants, they arguably would be permitted 
to restrain the plaintiff for some purpose 
related to the proper execution of the search 
warrant since he was present in the residence 
being searched. 
 
Reasonable Grounds? 
 
In evaluating the basis for the police action and 
the manner in which it was carried out, a “court 
must determine whether there was an 
objectively reasonable basis, given the 
circumstances faced by the police officer, for 
the actions undertaken”. Justice Fruman, 
authoring the unanimous judgment, stated: 
 
Essentially, s. 25(1) is a safe harbour from 
liability for those who are required to enforce 
the law. The police are often placed in 
situations in which they must make difficult 
decisions quickly, and are to be afforded some 
latitude for the choices they make…Courts 
recognize that law enforcement is dangerous; 
no one wants police officers to compromise 
their safety. On the other hand, s. 25(1) is not 
an absolute waiver of liability, permitting 
officers to act in any manner they see fit…The 
police are entitled to be wrong, but they must 
act reasonably. [para. 22, references omitted] 
 
The search warrant, as suggested by the police, 
did not confirm the existence of reasonable 
grounds for their actions in executing it. Rather, 
the search warrant provided reasonable grounds 
that evidence could be found in the residence. 
The search warrant by itself, though based on 
reasonable grounds, did not give the police carte 
blanche to execute the warrant in any manner 
they wanted. They were required to establish 
reasonable grounds for the way they executed 
the warrant, which included using the tactical 
team in an aggressive manner in restraining the 
plaintiff.  
 
The police argued, unsuccessfully, that they 
were concerned the occupants of the residence 
were armed, which justified the use of the 
tactical team. There was no evidence to support 
this position. The information to obtain the 
search warrant had been sealed and the officer 
who obtained it declined to state the basis for 
his belief that there was a possibility of weapons 
at the residence. Without this information, the 
police could not meet their burden in 
establishing reasonable grounds for executing 
the warrant in an aggressive manner. Justice 
Fruman added: 
 
Unlike many cases in which s. 25(1) is invoked, 
in this case the police decisions were not made 
in the heat of the moment, but with the 
benefit of reflection, discussion and an 
assessment of risk. The police decided to 
deploy the tac team and to execute the search 
warrant in a manner that required [the 
plaintiff] to be aggressively secured and 
restrained. They are answerable for these 
choices. The police need not demonstrate the 
correct decision was made, but that the 
decision was made on reasonable grounds 
based on the circumstances known at the time. 
Normally, this onus would not be a difficult one 
to meet when there is a possibility the 
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occupants of a residence will be armed. 
However, in the unusual circumstances of this 
case, there was absolutely no independent 
evidence to substantiate that possibility. 
[para. 40] 
 
Unnecessary Force? 
 
Even if the police acted on reasonable grounds in 
the aggressive manner they did, they will not be 
protected from liability if they used excessive 
force. Justice Fruman described the test as 
follows: 
 
Police officers act in dangerous and 
unpredictable circumstances. No doubt a 
trained police officer will have instructions 
and a game plan to follow when entering 
premises to execute a search warrant. But the 
officer will have to react to the circumstances 
that present themselves. Accordingly, police 
officers will be exempt from liability “ if they 
use no more force than is necessary having 
regard to their reasonably held assessment of 
the circumstances and dangers in which they 
find themselves”… 
 
Police officers are not expected to measure 
the precise amount of force the situation 
requires…Nor will they be denied the 
protection of s. 25(1) if they fail to use the 
least amount of force that would achieve the 
desired result. Allowance must be made for an 
officer, in the exigency of the moment, 
misjudging the degree of necessary 
force…Accordingly, the immediate decisions a 
police officer makes in the course of duty are 
not assessed through the “lens of 
hindsight”…[paras. 44-45, references omitted] 
 
In this case, the amount of force used was 
excessive. The plaintiff was not combative, he 
did not resist or attempt to flee, and was 
compliant. The trial judge concluded that the 
degree of force used was unnecessary in the 
circumstances.   
 
The police had not established all three 
branches of the s.25 defence analysis and their 
appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
POLICE NOT NEGLIGENT IN 
DRUNK’s DEATH 
Roy v. Attorney General of BC,  
2005 BCCA 88 
 
The family of a man dieing in 
police custody successfully sued 
the government when the police 
were found partly negligent in 
failing to seek medical 
treatment for his intoxicated condition. The 
deceased, who was 56 years old, was arrested 
for being intoxicated in a public place under 
British Columbia’s Liquor Control and Licensing 
Act after a citizen called to report that a drunk 
male had stumbled to the ground while trying to 
get into his car. The attending officer found the 
male lying on the ground and concluded he was 
severely intoxicated. He was non responsive, was 
picked up, carried to, and placed in the back of a 
police vehicle. He was transported to the police 
station where he was placed on a blanket and 
dragged to the “drunk tank”.  
 
His personal effects were removed and he was 
rolled into the recovery position in his cell. 
Although he had no signs of external injury, he 
was drowsy, had difficulty communicating, and 
very limited physical reaction to his 
surroundings. However, no medical check was 
performed. About 23 minutes after being 
booked in, the jail guard checked him and found 
his snoring and breathing had stopped. Attempts 
to revive him were unsuccessful and he was later 
pronounced dead at the hospital. The experts 
agreed that he died from acute alcohol ingestion, 
which occurs when large amounts of alcohol are 
consumed, acting as a central nervous system 
depressant, and leading to coma, respiratory 
depression, and eventually respiratory arrest. If 
timely medical intervention is sought and the 
alcohol toxicity detected, death can be averted.  
 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court, 
Justice Neilson found negligence on part of the 
police that contributed to their prisoner’s death 
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(2002 BCSC 1021). She found that police owe 
prisoners in their custody a duty of care, 
particularly when intoxicated. In her view, police 
policy manuals assist the court in determining 
the standard of care. In this case, police policy 
required a person of “questionable 
consciousness” to be medically assessed. As 
Justice Neilson noted: 
 
I would expect such an assessment to include, 
at a minimum, an attempt to converse with the 
person about how much he or she has had to 
drink, and what other causes there may be for 
his or her condition. I would expect some 
attempt to make him or her respond to basic 
commands to assess the level of awareness. I 
would expect the officer do a basic physical 
examination to determine if the person has 
suffered any injuries, and whether the vital 
signs such as pulse and breathing are stable. I 
would also expect the officer to investigate 
the circumstances in which he or she was 
found, including speaking to available witnesses 
about their observations. [para. 128] 
 
Since the police did not perform an adequate 
assessment or investigation into their prisoner’s 
state of consciousness or its cause, the police 
failed to meet the standard of care required. 
Justice Neilson concluded that if the prisoner 
had been medically assessed, the progression of 
his respiratory distress would have been 
identified and he would have received immediate 
assistance to save him. Justice Neilson split 
liability 50/50 between the police and the 
prisoner—the police for failing to meet the 
standard of care and the prisoner for his self-
induced intoxication.  
 
The Attorney General appealed the judgment to 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal. In a 4:1 
decision, the lawsuit was dismissed. Justice 
Southin, with Justices Saunders and Lowry 
concurring, found that the trial judge erred. 
Although the police owe a duty of care to a 
prisoner and must take reasonable steps for 
their safety, the police are not an insurer. The 
constables in this case believed their prisoner 
was simply a passed out drunk. He was extremely 
intoxicated but had no signs of external injury. 
It never occurred to them that he was of 
“questionable consciousness” as defined in policy 
or that he needed medical attention.  
 
Nor could it be expected that police officers 
would “recognize the difference between a 
person obviously inebriated who is merely ‘passed 
out’ and such a person who is on the verge of 
central nervous system failure”. Although police 
policy is an important factor for courts to 
consider in determining the standard of care, 
the trial judge treated the police policy as 
statute and also imposed her own standard of 
care, which required officers to perform a 
physical examination, check vital signs, and 
converse with the prisoner.  In noting that 
hindsight cannot be the foundation for liability, 
Justice Southin wrote: 
 
I think it right that we remind ourselves of 
what the principal duty of a peace officer is. 
It is to keep the Queen’s peace, an obligation 
which includes the prevention of crime and the 
detection of criminals. Peace officers are not 
emergency services personnel and cannot be 
held, unless and until they receive similar 
training, to a standard which would be 
appropriate for such persons. [para. 41] 
 
Justice Hall, writing a concurring judgment, 
agreed with Justice Southin that the police were 
not negligent. He looked at other cases where 
the police had been found liable for a prisoner’s 
injuries, but found this case different because it 
was not obvious the prisoner had any physical 
injuries. He stated: 
 
It was simply a case of the police dealing with 
an individual who appeared to have had a 
considerable amount to drink–an amount 
sufficient to cause him to pass out.  If peace 
officers were required to take every individual 
they find heavily intoxicated to a hospital for 
assessment, it seems to me that this would 
have very dramatic implications for both 
hospitals and police forces.  This could have a 
tendency to prevent police officers assisting in 
a timely way those in need of assistance.  Here 
the officers took positive steps to place the 
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deceased in what they thought was a safe 
environment; namely, the jail cells, in order to 
enable him to regain consciousness in a 
protected environment.  Unfortunately, 
unknown to the officers, Mr. Roy had ingested 
so much alcohol that he died from the effects 
of alcohol on his vital functions.  But I cannot 
see from the circumstances in this case that 
there was anything particular to alert the 
officers that this deceased was in peril. [para. 
53] 
 
A Dissenting Opinion 
 
Justice Oppal was the lone dissent of the five 
member panel. In his view, the trial judge did 
not err in finding the officers should have 
recognized the prisoner was in need of medical 
treatment. The police policy made it clear that 
persons of “questionable consciousness” shall 
first be medically examined before being placed 
in a cell. There was no discretion available to 
the officers about what they ought to have 
done and the fact there were no signs of injury 
made no difference.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
TRESPASSING ON ADJACENT 
PROPERTY DOES NOT RENDER 
EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Hok, 2005 BCCA 132 
 
While investigating a marihuana 
grow operation at a residence, 
police went onto the neighbour’s 
adjoining property on five 
occasions at night. From there, 
the police were able to view the accused’s hydro 
meter spinning, concluding that electricity 
consumption was high. This information was used, 
in part, to support the issuance of a search 
warrant. Prior to the warrant being executed, 
the accused emerged unexpectedly and was 
arrested driving away. The keys were taken from 
the ignition and found to open the door to the 
grow operation. Police executed the search 
warrant and the accused was charged with 
producing a controlled substance and possession 
for the purpose of trafficking.   
 
At his trial the accused was convicted of both 
charges. Although the arrest was found to be 
unlawful because the officers only had 
reasonable grounds to detain—not arrest—the 
accompanying search should have been 
restricted to immediate safety concerns, not the 
collection of evidence. As such, the seizure of 
the keys exceeded the ambit of an investigative 
safety search and resulted in a s.8 Charter 
breach. However, the keys were admitted 
because the administration of justice would not 
be brought into disrepute. 
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing that the trial court 
erred in admitting the evidence. In his view, the 
police committed an offence under s.177 of the 
Criminal Code—trespass at night—when they 
entered onto his neighbour’s property to inspect 
his hydro meter. This unlawful action, the 
accused contended, rendered the search a 
violation of s.8 and the evidence inadmissible. 
 
Without deciding whether the police committed 
an offence contrary to s.177 of the Criminal 
Code, Justice Southin, authoring the unanimous 
appeal court judgment, concluded that a court is 
not permitted to exclude illegally obtained 
evidence unless it was obtained in breach of the 
accused’s Charter rights. In this case, the 
trespass was against the neighbour, not the 
accused. However, Justice Southin made the 
following comment: 
 
I would not want it to be thought that I find 
this state of the law pleasing.  As a 
householder, I would not want any peace 
officer coming onto my property without my 
leave and licence, whether by day or by night, 
for the purpose of spying on my neighbours.  
Otherwise, if he were in "hot pursuit" of a 
fleeing burglar. [para. 12] 
 
As for the admission of the keys, Justice 
Southin stated: 
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Had the officers not seized the key which 
they then used to execute the warrant, they 
would have had to enter the house by breaking 
down the front door and thereafter go to the 
basement by breaking down the basement 
door.  Having found the marihuana, they would 
then have had the lawful right to arrest the 
[accused], seize the key in question and match 
it to the locks on the front and basement 
doors. 
 
To exclude the key in these circumstances 
would make the administration of justice look 
silly. [paras. 15-16] 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
RISK OF DEPORTATION A 
FACTOR IN SENTENCING 
R. v. Kanthasamy, 2005 BCCA 135 
 
The accused entered a 
bedroom where a female 
prostitute was being confined 
after she had been kidnapped 
and sexually assaulted by three other men. He 
then sexually assaulted her and was 
subsequently convicted of sexual assault and 
unlawful confinement for his participation in the 
crime. The accused, a 26-year-old permanent 
resident of Canada from Sri Lanka, was 
sentenced to two years imprisonment while the 
other adult offenders received four year 
sentences.  
 
Because he received a two year sentence, the 
accused became inadmissible to Canada under 
s.36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act. This section renders a 
permanent resident inadmissible from Canada if 
they were convicted of an offence punishable by 
at least 10 years in prison or if they receive a 
sentence of at least six months. Furthermore, if 
a permanent resident receives a sentence of at 
least two years, they lose their right to appeal a 
finding of inadmissibility.  
 
The accused successfully appealed his sentence 
to a unanimous British Columbia Court of Appeal 
arguing it was unfit. In Justice Donald’s view, 
the serious, but unintended collateral effect of 
the accused’s sentence was a factor to consider 
in choosing an appropriate sentence. In this 
case, the difference of one day—two years 
versus two years less a day—determined 
whether the accused could appeal his 
deportation on humanitarian grounds or not. If 
he could not appeal, his return to Sri Lanka at 
grave risk of harm and persecution by the Tamil 
Tigers, a group of insurgents that extorted 
money from his family and murdered his 
brother, was inevitable.  
 
Although a two year term also determines 
whether a prisoner does federal or provincial 
time or whether a probation order is available, 
Justice Donald concluded, “the substitution of a 
term of two years less a day does no violence to 
the sentence imposed…and avoids an unintended 
consequence of great significance”. The 
sentence was reduced from two years to two 
years less a day “to prevent the 
disproportionate ramifications of a single day of 
imprisonment.” 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
DID YOU KNOW? 
 
…that a recent BC Coroners Service report 
entitled “Motor Vehicle Accidental Deaths” 4has 
the community of Surrey at the top of its list 
for having the most fatalities involving motor 
vehicles in 2003. The top five British Columbia 
communities in 2003 were as follows: 
 
Town/City Motor Vehicle Accident Deaths 
Surrey  37 
Vancouver 26 
Victoria 21 
Kelowna 20 
Abbotsford  15 
                                                 
4 Available at www.pssg.gov.bc.ca/ coroners. 
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REASONABLE GROUNDS 
UNIQUE TO EACH SITUATION 
Trudgian v. Wood, 2005 SKCA 13 
 
Three days after a broomball 
game among RCMP cadets, a 
female cadet reported to her 
superior officer that the 
plaintiff—also an RCMP cadet—grabbed her 
breasts in a sexual manner during the game. A 
city police officer spoke to the complainant the 
following day and obtained a written statement 
from her. As well, an RCMP Corporal and 
Sergeant to whom the complainant spoke after 
the alleged assault were interviewed. No further 
investigation was conducted, nor were any of the 
other broomball participants or the plaintiff 
interviewed. Less than two hours were spent on 
the investigation and the accused was arrested. 
He was charged with sexual assault but later 
acquitted in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s 
Bench.  
 
The plaintiff successfully sued the city police 
for wrongful imprisonment. Although the trial 
judge found the arresting officer subjectively 
believed he had reasonable grounds for the 
arrest, the grounds were not objectively 
justified. He awarded the plaintiff $1,500 in 
pecuniary damages and $50,000 in general 
damages. He found the plaintiff was traumatized 
and also experienced difficulties regaining his 
employment as a corrections officer and getting 
promoted. The defendants appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal arguing the trial 
judge erred in finding that an arrest could not 
be made solely on the evidence of a complainant. 
As well, the amount of damages was appealed. 
 
A unanimous Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
upheld the lawsuit. An officer can, in some cases, 
arrest based almost solely on a complainant's 
statement, but cannot selectively listen to the 
complainant and decline to look at the rest of 
the evidence available to them. In examining the 
existence of reasonable grounds, Justice 
Gerwing stated: 
 
The issue of whether reasonable and probable 
grounds exists is a factual matter and will be 
decided in each case on the facts, which will 
almost always be unique. That is, in some 
instances and with some accuseds, a statement 
of a complainant which does not give rise to 
obvious need for further questioning may be 
found by a trier of fact to be sufficient. In 
other circumstances, a statement not 
otherwise supported may be found not to be 
adequate. No formula can be laid down by trial 
judges or this Court; it is in each instance for 
the trial judge to apply the test [laid down by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.] Storrey 
to the facts before him. [para. 11] 
 
Furthermore, “the test for determining whether 
or not the objective basis exists for the arrest 
is applied at the moment it is made. Subsequent 
conduct, even if of diligent nature and in accord 
with police procedure, cannot retroactively 
validate an arrest and wrongful detention.” The 
fact the arresting officer later conducted 
further investigation did not provide 
justification for the arrest when it was made.  
 
In this case, the trial judge did not err in holding 
more investigation was needed. Justice Gerwing 
wrote: 
 
[The trial judge] focused on the fact the 
sexual assault occurred in a sanctioned sport 
witnessed by the entire troop and supervisors. 
The timing, the nature of the contact and the 
clothing worn and the fact that the [plaintiff] 
was carrying a broomball stick at the time 
were all suggestive to the trial judge that, at 
least, further investigation ought to have been 
undertaken. After a review of the evidence 
before him, we are of the view that there was 
evidence on which he could conclude as he did 
and we are not in a position to interfere. [para. 
12] 
 
The damage appeal was allowed. The Court of 
Appeal found $50,000 to be excessive and 
reduced the general damages to $30,000. 
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
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COMMON LAW SEIZURE 
REQUIRES RETURN TO 
JUSTICE 
R. v. Backhouse, 
(2005) Docket: C35171 (OntCA) 
 
A masked man entered the 
victim’s home, shooting and 
killing him, his friend, and 
seriously wounding a third 
person. The victim’s 12 year old 
daughter saw the shooting, went next door, and 
called 911. She reported the accused and his 
brother were involved because they had 
threatened to kill her father in the past. Other 
information was acquired and the police believed 
they had enough to make an arrest. 
 
Police arrested the accused about two hours 
after the shooting when he was located at a 
telephone booth. He was taken to the police 
station where his clothing was seized and he was 
provided with a garment to wear. He provided 
two written statements, but declined to have 
them audio or videotaped. As well, police 
conducted a gunshot residue test on the 
accused’s hands. The test was performed by 
dabbing his hand with two-sided sticky tape—a 
process taking about 12 minutes. Police then 
released the accused, believing they did not have 
enough evidence to hold him but they continued 
their investigation. 
 
At his trial in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice, the accused was convicted by a jury of 
first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and 
attempted murder. He appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other issues, 
that the arrest was made without reasonable 
grounds, the clothing seizure and gunshot 
residue test were unreasonable, the police failed 
to complete a return to a justice—thereby 
rendering the seizure illegal—and failed to 
adequately record his statements rendering 
them inadmissible. 
 
Validity of Arrest 
 
The accused submitted the police lacked the 
reasonable grounds necessary for his arrest and 
the trial judge erred in so concluding. The 
Ontario Court of Appeal rejected this argument 
and found it was open to the trial judge to 
conclude the police had reasonable grounds to 
arrest. 
 
A valid arrest requires reasonable grounds to 
believe a suspect has committed an indictable 
offence. These grounds must be subjectively 
held by the officer and must have an objective 
basis. The police do not need a prima facie case 
to make an arrest, but cannot ignore the obvious. 
Here, Justice Rosenberg, writing the unanimous 
decision, found the arrest lawful: 
 
Based on the information available to the 
police in the early hours after the shooting, 
their decision to arrest the [accused] was 
reasonable.  This was the very epitome of a 
volatile, potentially dangerous and rapidly 
changing situation.  Three people had been 
shot, two of them fatally.  An armed and 
dangerous man was at loose in the community.  
Suspicion immediately and reasonably focused 
on the [accused] and his brother because of 
[the daughter’s] statement and the well-known 
animus between the Backhouse and Steptoe 
families.  The [accused] had recently been 
involved in a court case in which one of the 
victims of this shooting, Roy, had been a 
victim.  A truck of the kind associated with 
the Backhouses was thought to have been in 
the area at the time of the shooting.  Officers 
who knew the [accused] and his brother 
believed that the [accused] best fit the 
description given, despite the discrepancies. 
[para. 66] 
 
Furthermore, releasing a suspect without charge 
should not be given any weight in assessing 
whether reasonable grounds existed. “The fact 
that the police ultimately decided not to charge 
the [accused] at that time does not undermine 
the validity of the original arrest,” stated 
Justice Rosenberg. “The courts should avoid an 
analysis of events that encourage police to 
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detain suspects unnecessarily for fear that the 
decision will be held against them when the 
validity of the arrest is scrutinized”.  
 
Clothing Seizure 
 
The accused argued that the seizure of his 
clothing constituted a strip search. In R. v. 
Golden 2001 SCC 83, the Supreme Court of 
Canada adopted the following definition of a 
strip search; “the removal or rearrangement of 
some or all of the clothing of a person so as to 
permit a visual inspection of a person’s private 
areas, namely genitals, buttocks, breast (in the 
case of a female), or undergarments”.  In this 
case, the removal of clothing was not for the 
purpose of inspecting the accused’s private parts 
or undergarments.  
 
Generally, a valid search incident to arrest 
requires a lawful arrest, must be related to the 
reasons for the arrest, and must not be 
conducted in an abusive fashion. Here the arrest 
was lawful. The seizure of the clothing was to 
inspect and examine it for blood or gunshot 
residue. Only by seizing the clothing could the 
police preserve the evidence and prevent its 
disposal.    
 
Further, the seizure was not abusive. Male 
officers took the accused’s clothing without 
using force. It was quick and without humiliation. 
Justice Rosenberg stated: 
 
In my view, where the police have lawfully 
arrested a suspect in a very recent homicide 
such as occurred in this case, they are entitled 
to seize his or her clothing for the purpose of 
preserving evidence.  There are compelling 
reasons for authorizing such seizures as an 
incident to arrest for homicide since it is 
reasonable to suspect that a forensic 
examination of the clothing might yield 
evidence. [para. 90] 
 
Gunshot Residue Test 
 
The hand washing for gunshot residue was also 
found to be valid as an incident to arrest. It was 
necessary to preserve evidence and had to be 
conducted within a few hours of handling the 
firearm. It did not involve the seizure of bodily 
substances (like DNA samples) and was carried 
out in a reasonable fashion. There was no force 
used and the procedure was non intrusive and did 
not interfere with the accused’s dignity or bodily 
integrity. Justice Rosenberg wrote: 
 
The state had a legitimate interest in 
conducting the hand washing in this case to 
determine whether the [accused] had been 
handling a firearm.  The procedure was 
conducted within hours of the shooting, within 
the time that useful results could be expected 
to be obtained.  The [accused’s] right to 
privacy was not seriously compromised by the 
procedure.  He was already lawfully under 
arrest, the procedure was not intrusive, and it 
involved only a washing of the surface of the 
skin.  It was far removed from the strip 
search considered in R. v. Golden, or a body 
cavity search.  I note that in Golden the 
Supreme Court held that even strip searches 
could be conducted as searches incident to 
arrest, provided certain conditions are 
met…No such additional conditions are 
necessary for a hand washing test. [para. 143] 
 
Return to a Justice 
 
The accused also contended that even if the 
clothing seizure was lawful as an incident to 
arrest, its continued seizure was unlawful 
because the police did not make a return to a 
justice as required by s.489.1 of the Criminal 
Code. The Crown, on the other hand, submitted 
that s.489.1 was enacted to deal with statutory 
seizures, but not seizures undertaken pursuant 
to common law.  
 
In deciding whether or not s.489.1 was broad 
enough to encompass common law seizures—in 
this case a search incident to arrest—the appeal 
court examined several factors; grammatical and 
ordinary meaning, legislative history and 
Parliament’s intention, the scheme of the Act, 
and legislative context. In holding that a return 
to a justice should have been made, Justice 
Rosenberg concluded: 
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Accordingly, in my view, s. 489.1 applied to the 
seizure of the [accused’s] clothing and that 
clothing should have been brought before a 
justice or a report should have been made to 
the justice in accordance with that section.  
The continued detention of the material seized 
was accordingly unlawful.  It does not 
necessarily follow, however, that the continued 
unlawful detention violated the [accused’s] 
Charter rights.  The initial search and seizure 
was lawful and complied with the Charter…I 
need not decide whether the subsequent 
failure to comply with s. 489.1 could render 
the initial lawful seizure unreasonable. Even if 
the detention of the clothing did violate the 
[accused’s] rights under s. 8, I would not 
exclude the evidence obtained by the analysis 
of the [accused’s] jacket. [para. 115] 
 
Statement Voluntariness 
 
Finally, the accused argued that the Crown failed 
in its burden of proving the statements made to 
the police were voluntary, in part, by their 
failure to videotape them. Justice Rosenberg, 
however, declined to interfere with the trial 
judge’s ruling that there was an adequate record 
from which a finding of voluntariness could be 
made. Although an audio or video recording can 
easily satisfy the Crown’s onus in establishing 
voluntariness, there is no absolute rule requiring 
recordings. But, as the court had early noted in 
R. v. Moore-McFarlane, (2003) Docket: C31374 & 
C30881 (OntCA), “where…recording facilities are 
readily available, and the police deliberately set 
out to interrogate the suspect without giving any 
thought to the making of a reliable record, the 
context inevitably makes the resulting non-
recorded interrogation suspect”.  
 
In this case, however, the failure to record was 
not suspect. Rather, the accused agreed to 
speak to the police only if it was not recorded.  
But the court cautioned that it would not always 
be an answer as to why the police failed to 
record a statement that the suspect refused to 
participate.  A statement could be audio 
recorded or a suspect’s wishes could at least be 
electronically recorded, to avoid any later 
dispute.  Depending on context, a bare assertion 
by police officers that the suspect refused to 
be videotaped or even tape-recorded could be 
viewed with concern.  
 
The appeal was allowed on other grounds and a 
new trial was ordered.   
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
FIREARM ROADBLOCK 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
R. v Clayton & Farmer, 
(2005) Docket:C37990-C36722 (OntCA) 
 
Police received a 911 call at 
about 1:25 am from a male 
located across the street from a 
large strip club. The caller, who 
identified himself by name, told 
police there were about ten black males, casually 
dressed, congregating outside the strip club and 
that four of them had handguns. The caller also 
described four vehicles by colour and model (a 
tan Lexus, a black Jeep Cherokee, a black GMC 
Blazer, and a white Acura Legend5) that he 
associated with the group of men. When asked 
to check, the caller confirmed there was still a 
crowd in the parking area but that one of the 
vehicles had left. The gun call was dispatched 
and police officers responded.  
 
The first officers on scene saw a group of men 
outside the club, but no weapons. Two officers 
positioned themselves at the parking lot’s rear 
exit at 1:26 am, intending on stopping and 
searching any vehicle and its occupants 
attempting to exit the lot.  At 1:27 am the first 
vehicle—a black Jaguar—arrived, but it did not 
resemble the description of any of the reported 
associated vehicles. The vehicle was stopped 
when police pulled their car in front of it, 
blocking the exit. The accused Farmer was 
driving and Clayton was a passenger. Both men 
were black. The men were told police were 
                                                 
5 See R. v. Clayton & Farmer, [2001] OJ No. 2393 (OntSCJ) for vehicle 
descriptions. 
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investigating a gun call and asked them to step 
out of the vehicle.  
 
Clayton complied, but was evasive when 
questioned and appeared nervous, while Farmer 
exited with some reluctance. An officer placed 
his hand on Clayton to direct him to the back of 
the car. A struggle ensued and Clayton fled back 
towards the strip club. Police pursued and 
Clayton was apprehended trying to enter the 
club. A bouncer identified him as one of the 
males having a gun. He was handcuffed and police 
found a loaded handgun in his pocket. Farmer, 
who remained at the car, was arrested for 
possessing the gun found on Clayton and he was 
handcuffed, and searched. A loaded handgun was 
found tucked in the back of his pants.  Both men 
were charged with numerous firearms offences.  
 
At their trial in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice both men were convicted after the 
judge ruled the evidence admissible. In his view, 
the initial brief detention of the vehicle to 
screen cars leaving the area was permissible at 
common law. However, the officers intended on 
searching the men from the moment the vehicle 
was stopped without having a reasonable and 
individualized suspicion they were involved in a 
crime. Continuing the detention by removing 
them from the car to search them resulted in 
their rights to be secure from arbitrary 
detention and unreasonable search violated. 
Clayton’s s.10(b) right to counsel was also 
infringed. Despite the breaches, in the judge’s 
view the exclusion of the guns would bring the 
administration of justice into greater disrepute 
than to admit them. 
 
Farmer and Clayton then appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. Justice Doherty, writing the 
unanimous judgment, found the Charter rights of 
both accused had been seriously infringed. There 
was neither statutory authority for the 
roadblock nor any reasonable individualized 
suspicion that could justify an investigative 
detention as described by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52. Nor was this 
a case involving a roadblock similar to the type 
used by police for highway safety matters. As 
such, any authority for the type of roadblock 
undertaken in this case would have to find 
mooring in the ancillary police power doctrine.  
 
At common law, the ancillary power doctrine 
recognizes that police conduct interfering with a 
person’s liberty can be justified if the police 
were (1) acting in the course of their duty and 
(2) their conduct was a justifiable use of police 
powers associated to that duty. In assessing 
whether police conduct is justified a number of 
factors must be considered, including: 
 
• the duty performed,  
• the liberty interfered with,  
• the nature and extent of the 
interference, 
• the extent to which some interference 
with liberty is necessitated to perform 
the duty, and   
• the importance of the duty to the public 
good. 
 
In this case, the police had a duty to investigate 
and prevent crime and stopping the car was done 
while acting in the course of that duty. Justice 
Doherty noted: 
 
The police were investigating criminal activity, 
hoped to apprehend individuals in possession of 
dangerous weapons and seize those weapons 
before they could be used in criminal activity 
to harm others.  Criminal conduct involving the 
use of firearms, especially handguns, is a 
serious and growing societal danger.  The law 
abiding segment of the community expects the 
police to react swiftly and decisively to seize 
illegal firearms and arrest those in possession 
of them.  The risk posed to the community by 
those in possession of handguns gives an added 
significance to police efforts to seize those 
weapons and apprehend those in possession of 
them beyond the always important police duty 
to investigate and prevent criminal activity. 
[para. 41] 
 
However, the court found the police conduct did 
not pass the second prong of the ancillary power 
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doctrine—the justifiability factors. Here, the 
roadblock stop engaged the criminal process 
against the targets of the roadblock by 
determining whether the occupants of a stopped 
vehicle were involved in criminal activity. The 
detention and searching of all vehicles and 
occupants leaving the parking area was a 
profound interference with individual autonomy 
and privacy. “Being stopped by the police, 
questioned about guns, told to exit the vehicle, 
and made to stand against the vehicle in a public 
place while the police examine the inside of the 
vehicle, can be a frightening and humiliating 
experience,” said Justice Doherty.  
 
Although he agreed that the use of roadblocks 
to investigate crimes and apprehend criminals 
might be a justifiable intrusion on individual 
liberties in some cases, this was not one such 
case. Since the police did not have grounds to 
suspect any specific person, a roadblock could 
only be justified if there were reasonable 
grounds to believe a serious crime had been 
committed and the roadblock may apprehend 
the offenders. Here, the description provided 
by the 911 caller was detailed. The perpetrators 
were described as black males, casually dressed, 
and the specific make and models of four 
vehicles connected to the men were provided.  
 
Rather than limiting their stops to persons in 
vehicles that resembled the description 
provided by the 911 caller, the police cast too 
wide a net in stopping all vehicles leaving the 
parking area without having reasonable grounds 
to believe stopping motorists not matching the 
description would result in apprehending the 
perpetrators and recovering the guns. Had the 
police narrowed their focus consistent with the 
information provided, the accused’s vehicle 
would not have been stopped and it would have 
been free to pass.  
 
Since the police could not justify stopping all 
vehicles under the ancillary power doctrine, the 
stop was unlawful and the accused were 
arbitrarily detained. Questioning them at the 
vehicle and the examination of the vehicle’s 
interior also violated their rights under s.8. 
Justice Doherty did note, however, that if he 
had found the stop constitutional, the police 
would have been entitled to frisk the occupants 
if there was reason to suspect they were 
armed: 
 
In my view, legitimate police safety concerns 
justify a “pat-down” search of occupants 
removed from vehicles at a roadblock where 
the police have information that provides 
reasonable grounds to believe that one or more 
of the individuals detained at the roadblock 
may be armed.  I do not think the police can be 
put in a position where they may have to turn 
their back on the occupants of the vehicle 
without first conducting a “pat-down” search.  
While my conclusion that a “pat-down” search 
would be warranted extends the police power, 
it also significantly increases the interference 
with individual liberty occasioned by the 
roadblock stop.  As that interference grows, 
arguments which are said to make the conduct 
justifiable must become all the more 
compelling. [para. 67]     
 
Unlike the trial judge, the appeal court ruled the 
handguns inadmissible as evidence. The Charter 
violations were characterized as significant. The 
police intended to stop and search all vehicles 
and their occupants. The accused were “entitled 
to proceed on their way [but] found themselves 
in a potentially demeaning and frightening 
confrontation with police.” The fact Clayton and 
Farmer were in possession of handguns did not 
minimize the breach—“criminals do not have 
different constitutional rights than the rest of 
the community,” said Justice Doherty. 
 
The Court was also very critical of police 
training. Not only did the police fail to consider 
the relevant factors in assessing the ancillary 
power doctrine, they did not consider and 
balance the demands of their duties against 
interfering with individual liberties. Nor did 
they have an appreciation for the scope of their 
search powers. Police ignorance of the limits of 
their ancillary powers was institutional and 
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related to their training. Justice Doherty 
stated: 
 
The failure of the police force to properly 
train its officers to exercise their powers in a 
manner consistent with the Charter was made 
all the more damaging by the absence of 
effective supervision by more senior police 
officers.  On the findings of the trial judge, 
the decision to set up the roadblock stop was a 
more or less spontaneous one made by 
individual officers unguided by any protocol or 
by any input from senior officers who might be 
expected to provide a more tailored response 
to the circumstances of a particular case.  The 
procedures to be followed at the roadblock 
stop were also left entirely at the discretion 
of the officers.  There was no plan. 
 
I also cannot accept that the exigencies or 
urgency of the situation should mitigate the 
seriousness of the police failure to properly 
consider the legal limits of their authority.  I 
repeat, this was not a case where the police 
directed their minds to the proper 
considerations and reached a conclusion that 
the court concludes was wrong.  Were that the 
case, the exigencies and urgency of the 
situation would be relevant.  Here, the conduct 
of the police had nothing to do with the need 
to make quick decisions.  On the training 
provided to these officers by their police 
force, once the officers received a “gun call”, 
they were entitled to proceed as they did.  On 
the training provided to these officers, there 
was no need for any split second decision-
making or in fact any decision-making at all. 
 
Having read the evidence of [the officers], I 
am struck by the failure of their training to 
address in any way the limits of the ancillary 
power doctrine.  This court, and others 
including the Supreme Court of Canada, have 
endeavoured over at least the last decade to 
articulate the ancillary power doctrine in a way 
that is consistent with both the principles 
protected by the Charter and in the 
community need for effective law 
enforcement.  In interpreting that doctrine, 
the courts have recognized the difficulties 
inherent in policing, where officers face an 
infinite variety of fact situations and often 
must make quick decisions.  The case-specific 
approach developed in these authorities has 
not penetrated the training of the officers 
involved in this case.  The testimony of these 
officers strongly suggests that their police 
force has made no effort to embed the 
approach to the ancillary power doctrine 
adopted by the courts into police training.  
This systemic failure would suggest that the 
court must deliver its message in a more 
emphatic way.  The exclusion of evidence may 
provide that added emphasis.  
 
The systemic failings that underlie the 
conduct of [the officers] make the 
infringement of the rights of Farmer and 
Clayton serious.  Police training that leaves 
officers in the field unequipped to engage in 
the balancing process required by the ancillary 
power doctrine invites police officers to ignore 
individual rights whenever those rights get in 
the way of the execution of police duties.  If 
the rights guaranteed by the Charter are to 
have real meaning and shape the interaction 
between the police and individuals, police 
forces must take those rights seriously.  
Officers must be trained to perform their 
duties in a manner that is consistent with 
those rights. 
 
Bearing in mind both the significance of the 
Charter breaches and the abject failure of 
this police force to train its individual officers 
to honour Charter rights while performing 
their duties, I would characterize the 
infringements as serious. [paras. 87-91] 
 
In excluding the handguns as evidence, the court 
wrote: 
 
The third component of the s. 24(2) analysis 
examines the effect of the exclusion of the 
evidence obtained by the constitutional 
violation on the repute of the administration 
of justice.  Where the fairness of the trial is 
not affected by the admission of the impugned 
evidence, the exclusion of reliable evidence 
that conclusively establishes that an accused 
has committed a serious crime must have a 
negative impact on the way our criminal justice 
system is viewed by those who depend on it to 
keep them safe… 
 
 Volume 5 Issue 2             www.jibc.bc.ca 
March/April 2005 
21
If the handguns are excluded from evidence, 
Farmer and Clayton will in a very real sense 
have escaped justice and their serious crimes 
will go unpunished.  This harsh reality cannot 
be ignored in weighing the negative effect 
brought about by excluding the evidence.  Nor, 
however, can the negative effect of routinely 
admitting evidence obtained as a result of 
institutionally engrained disregard for 
individual constitutional rights be ignored.  The 
adjudication of any specific case on its merits 
is important to the repute of the 
administration of justice.  So too is the 
judicial reaction to constitutional abuses 
within the criminal justice system… 
 
Where, as in this case, constitutional violations 
reflect an institutional indifference to, if not 
disregard for, individual rights, judicial failure 
to disassociate itself from that conduct must 
have long-term negative consequences for the 
proper administration of justice.  The courts 
cannot be seen to at one and the same time 
wave a judicial finger of disapproval at police 
conduct that violates individual rights while 
embracing the evidentiary product of those 
violations whenever they do not undermine 
trial fairness.  
 
Courts can best demonstrate that 
constitutional rights are to be taken seriously 
by those who exercise powers that may 
impinge on those rights by excluding evidence 
obtained by constitutional violations that 
reflect an institutional failure to equip 
officers with the training necessary to 
perform their duties within the strictures of 
the Charter. [paras. 92-95] 
 
The appeal was allowed, the convictions were 
quashed, and acquittals were entered on all 
charges. 
 
Complete case available at www.onatriocourts.on.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Crime doesn’t pay…does that mean my job is a 
crime—Author unknown   
FLEEING PASSENGER’s 
DETENTION & SEARCH 
LAWFUL 
R. v. Cooper, 2005 NSCA 47 
 
Police attempted to initiate a 
traffic stop on a vehicle to 
check compliance with Nova 
Scotia’s Motor Vehicle Act 
when it accelerated and made several hard turns 
to evade the officers. As the vehicle traveled 
down a dead end street, its occupants opened 
the doors, bailed from the vehicle, and ran on 
foot. The accused—a passenger in the vehicle—
ignored commands to stop and fled through 
several backyards and hid in an apartment 
building’s foyer where he was found. He was 
handcuffed by the pursuing officer, walked out 
into the presence of other officers for safety, 
and a protective safety search was performed. 
Police found a butterfly knife in his pocket. 
When asked to identify himself, the accused 
provided a false name. He was charged with 
numerous weapons and other offences.  
 
At his trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court, the 
accused was convicted of possessing a weapon 
for a dangerous purpose and public mischief for 
providing a false name. The trial judge, relying on 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in R. v. 
Mann, 2004 SCC 52 ruled that the accused’s 
Charter rights had not been violated. She found 
his detention was not arbitrary because the 
officer had reasonable grounds to detain him 
when he fled from the vehicle after its driver 
took evasive action to elude the police. The 
judge held the officer would have been ignoring 
his duty to prevent crime and protect property 
if he did not chase the accused. The 
handcuffing, removal from the apartment 
building, and safety search were all 
proportionate to the officer’s duties and 
justifiable. Furthermore, the pat down search 
was not unreasonable and therefore did not 
breach s.8 of the Charter.  As such, in the trial 
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judge’s view there was no reason to resort to the 
exclusionary provision of s.24(2).  
 
The accused appealed his convictions to the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. In his view, there 
was no basis for the detention of the vehicle’s 
passenger in this case. He submitted that only 
the driver could be implicated in resisting the 
traffic stop. He argued, as a passenger, he was 
not connected to the motor vehicle offences 
committed by the driver in eluding police. Since 
there was no basis for his detention, he 
contended the trial judge erred in holding there 
were no Charter breaches, which could result in 
the exclusion of evidence—the knife and the 
false information he provided.  
 
Justice Fichaud, authoring the unanimous Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal judgment, dismissed the 
appeal. He first recognized that there is no 
general power of investigative detention, but 
rather a limited one at common law. A common 
law investigative detention involves a two-prong 
analysis. First, the police must have reasonable 
grounds to detain the individual—this requires 
more than a hunch, but less than reasonable 
grounds to justify an arrest. There must be a 
clear nexus, or connection, between the detainee 
and a recent or current offence. Justice Fichaud 
stated: 
 
Whether there are reasonable grounds for the 
detention is a "front end" assessment, as 
stated in Mann. The determination is made 
based on the information available to the 
police officer at the moment of detention. 
This is analogous to the principle that, 
whether there are reasonable grounds for an 
arrest is determined from the information 
available to the police officer at the time of 
the arrest, regardless of the later verdict on 
the charge for which the arrest was made… 
The detention occurs when the police officer 
stops the individual in a manner that involves 
significant physical or psychological restraint… 
In my view, this occurred when [the officer] 
apprehended [the accused] in the lobby of the 
apartment building after the chase. Whether 
there were reasonable grounds for this 
detention depends on the information known to 
[the officer] at that moment. This includes the 
facts related to the flight after the signalled 
traffic stop. It is not limited, as suggested by 
[the accused’s] counsel, only to the facts 
known to the officers when they initiated the 
attempted traffic stop… 
 
[T]he standard of reasonableness for 
detention differs from the standard for an 
arrest under s. 495(1) of the Code… The 
difference is reflected in the different 
wordings used in s. 495(1) for an arrest and 
the Supreme Court's formulation for 
detention. Section 495(1) states that there 
must be reasonable grounds that the accused 
"committed" or is "about to commit" an 
indictable offence or has been found 
"committing" a criminal offence. For detention, 
it is sufficient if there is a "clear nexus" or 
"connection" between the individual and the 
recent or current offence, or that the 
individual is "implicated in the criminal 
activity"…The different wordings recognise 
that the police power of detention, limited 
though it may be, is an investigative and not 
necessarily a charging power. The "nexus", 
"connection" or "implication" acknowledges 
that, at this investigatory stage, there may be 
a margin, spanned by the connection, between 
the individual and commission of the offence. 
[paras. 42-43, references omitted] 
 
The second prong of the test requires a 
“measuring of the circumstances of the 
detention against the practical requirements of 
the officer’s performance of his duties”.  
 
Reasonable Grounds to Detain 
 
In this case, the police intended to conduct a 
traffic stop to check general compliance, which 
is lawful under s.83(1) of Nova Scotia’s Motor 
Vehicle Act. When the vehicle fled, the police 
had a reasonable basis to conclude that there 
had been an offence under s.83—resisting a 
traffic stop. As well, the police were in the 
lawful execution of their duties and were 
justified in concluding that an offence under 
s.129 of the Criminal Code—resisting a peace 
officer—had also been committed.   
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If the driver had been the only one to flee and 
the accused had done nothing implicative by 
acting neutral there would have been no 
reasonable grounds to detain him. However, 
although the accused was merely a passenger 
who did not press the accelerator nor steer the 
wheel while the vehicle evaded police, he opened 
the car door, bailed out, and ran through 
backyards to elude police. His conduct, provided 
police with “an objective basis to suspect [he] 
was connected or implicated in what the police 
reasonably believed to be an offence of resisting 
a signaled traffic stop”.  As Justice Fichaud 
noted, “this is not a case of police using a general 
power of detention to satisfy their curiosity.”   
 
Proportionality 
 
In terms of measuring whether the police 
conduct in detaining the accused was 
proportionate to the performance of the 
officer’s police duties, Justice Fichaud found no 
error with the trial judge’s ruling. Police duties 
include preserving the peace, preventing crime, 
and protecting life and property. The officer’s 
pursuit and detention were within the scope of 
these duties. Moreover, based on the accused’s 
conduct, it was prudent for the officer to 
handcuff him—preventing his further flight. And 
it was also prudent for the lone officer to 
remove him from the apartment foyer into the 
presence of other officers before dealing 
further with him.  
 
The Search 
 
A non-consentual warrantless search in Canada is 
prima facie unreasonable unless the Crown can 
rebut this presumption by demonstrating it was 
authorized by a reasonable law and was carried 
out in a reasonable manner. At common law, a 
search can be carried out as an incident to a 
lawful investigative detention provided it is 
conducted for officer safety reasons—not to 
locate evidence. As Justice Fichaud noted: 
 
If the protective search for officer safety 
becomes an investigative search to locate 
evidence, the search will lose its lawful 
character as incidental to detention… [para. 
57, references omitted] 
 
The trial judge did not err in ruling that the 
search locating the butterfly knife in the 
accused’s pocket was genuinely a protective 
search—the officer testified he was searching 
for officer safety. In Justice Fichaud’s view, 
“the frisk of [the accused] and seizure of a 
prohibited weapon clearly is within the police 
entitlement to ‘go about their work secure in the 
knowledge that risks are minimized to the 
greatest extent possible’”. The search was lawful 
as an incident to detention and did not violate 
s.8. 
 
Since the false name provided did not follow any 
breaches under ss.8 or 9 of the Charter, there 
was no basis for excluding this evidence. The 
appeal was dismissed.    
 
Complete case available at www.courts.ns.ca 
 
WARRANT NEED NOT BE IN 
HAND  
R. v. Tran, 2005 BCCA 145 
 
The police obtained a search 
warrant to search a home for 
electricity theft. Prior to the 
warrant’s arrival at the target 
residence, a police surveillance team arrested 
the accused as he was leaving the home. The 
police, concerned that there may be other 
persons inside the home who witnessed the 
arrest and might destroy evidence, entered and 
found a large marihuana grow operation. The 
accused was convicted of production and 
possession of marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking in British Columbia Provincial Court. 
However, he appealed, in part, arguing that the 
entry by police without the warrant in their hand 
was unreasonable.  
 
Although s.29(1) of the Criminal Code provides 
that “it is the duty of every one who executes…a 
warrant to have it with him, where it is feasible 
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to do so”, the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
rejected the accused’s appeal. The unanimous 
court stated: 
 
[T]he search was justified on a legitimate 
belief that evidence may be lost while awaiting 
arrival of the warrant.  It was, in the 
circumstances, not feasible within the meaning 
of s. 29(1) to present the warrant at the 
beginning of the search.  As mentioned, the 
warrant was on its way at the time the 
surveillance team apprehended the [accused] 
and they acted out of a concern that if they 
did not act immediately in securing the 
premises, evidence could be destroyed.  This 
was not a warrantless search.  The warrant 
existed prior to the entry. [para. 14] 
 
The convictions were upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
IS LAWFUL CUSTODY FOR 
ESCAPE CHARGE 
R. v. Procknow et al, 2005 BCPC 56 
 
Three police officers attended a 
restaurant after a woman ran 
out onto the street and called 
for help. The restaurant was 
crowded and a doorman was sitting on top of the 
accused, who had a bloody hand. After speaking 
to several witnesses and learning the doorman 
had been hit with a glass, an officer detained 
the accused for an assault investigation and 
handcuffed him. He was searched for weapons 
and escorted outside the restaurant to a police 
vehicle. 
 
A crowd gathered outside the restaurant would 
not move for the officer so he yelled, “police, 
police, move, move.” The officer then began to 
physically push people out of the way. The 
accused was shoved to the ground while the 
officer became involved in an altercation with 
two other persons. The accused then got up, ran, 
and was apprehended a few blocks away. 
 
He was charged with assault causing bodily harm, 
assault with a weapon, and escaping lawful 
custody. Even though he had not been arrested, 
Justice Warren found the accused had been in 
lawful custody at the time he fled. She stated:  
 
[The accused] testified he understood he was 
not free to go and assumed he would be taken 
out to the police car. Although [the constable] 
could not recall how long he was in the 
restaurant prior to escorting [the accused] 
out, he estimated that the time was between a 
few minutes and up to five minutes. During this 
time, although [the accused] had not yet been 
formally arrested, chartered and warned, I am 
satisfied that in the circumstances he was told 
why he was being detained and handcuffed, 
and he was escorted out of the restaurant 
because of the commotion inside. While en 
route to the police car, events occurred 
outside of the control of the accompanying 
officer which reasonably took precedence for 
that officer. 
 
I am satisfied that during the brief time 
between the handcuffing and exiting the 
restaurant, [the accused’s] custodial status 
was lawful... [paras. 30-31] 
 
The accused was convicted of escape, despite 
acquittals on the assault related charges.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
COPS TOP JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
In a March, 2005 Leger 
Marketing report entitled 
“Profession Barometer”, police 
officers were the most trusted 
profession in the criminal justice system6. Eighty 
three percent of Canadians trusted police 
officers, followed by judges (72%), lawyers 
(45%); with lawmakers (politicians) dead last at 
16%.  
                                                 
6 The Leger Marketing Report provided trust ratings for 20 professional 
occupations.  
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Police 
 
Police officers are four percentage points higher 
on the trust barometer than last year, but down 
from 88% in 2002. 
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The police are trusted most in Atlantic Canada 
(92%), but least in British Columbia (80%). 
 
Judges 
 
The trust rating for judges dropped three 
percent from 2004 and is at a four year low at 
72%. 
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Judges are trusted most in Ontario (76%) and 
Alberta (76%), but least in British Columbia 
(66%). 
 
Lawyers 
 
Lawyers are up one percent over last year, but 
have not broken the 50% mark since 2002. 
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Lawyers are trusted most in Atlantic Canada 
(56%), but least in British Columbia (38%). 
 
Politicians (Law Makers) 
 
Politicians have jumped two points and have not 
been trusted by at least 20% of Canadians in the 
last four years. 
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Politicians are trusted most in Atlantic Canada 
(19%), but least in the Prairies.  
 
Of the other 16 professions identified in the 
report, firefighters ranked number one overall 
with a 97% trust rating, ahead of nurses (94%), 
farmers (91%), doctors (89%) and teachers 
(88%) rounding out the top five7. 
 
Complete report available at www.legermarketing.com 
                                                 
7 The remaining occupations following teachers in order of trust were police 
officers (83%), judges (72%), notaries (71%), bankers (65%), church 
representatives (65%), pollsters (65%), journalists (49%), senior public servants 
(45%), lawyers (45%), insurance brokers (44%), real estate agents (40%), 
unionists (38%), publicists (37%), car salespeople (18%), and politicians (16%).  
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DETENTION NOT ARBITRARY: 
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Nguyen, 2005 BCPC 60 
 
Two police officers were 
patrolling a park known to be 
frequented by drug dealers 
when they observed a car 
parked in a no parking zone and 
saw a male youth get into the back of the car, 
stay for only 15 seconds and then exit and walk 
away with two other males. The officers 
concluded that a drug transaction had just 
occurred. They pulled in behind the accused’s car 
and activated their emergency lights. 
 
The officers told the males on foot to remain 
where they were and approached the accused’s 
car. He was asked why he was parked in a no 
parking zone and said he had dropped off a 
friend, but did not know his friend’s name. He 
was sweating. Then an officer noted a small 
baggie of marihuana lying on the ground next to 
the youth. Everyone was then detained for an 
investigation under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act.  
 
The youth provided an unconvincing explanation 
as to what he was doing in the accused’s car. The 
accused then became very upset when asked 
what was going on. Fearing he was a threat to 
safety or likely to flee, the accused was forced 
to the ground and handcuffed. The youth then 
told police he had purchased $20 marihuana 
from the accused. The car was searched and 
marihuana, cell phones, and notepapers were 
seized. The accused was then arrested for 
trafficking marihuana and advised of his rights 
under s.10 of the Charter. 
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused argued his rights under the Charter 
were violated, including ss.8 and 9. Justice Low 
rejected these submissions. Although the 
accused was detained when the police stopped 
his car, it was not arbitrary. The police were 
entitled to question him about why he was 
stopped in the no parking zone. Furthermore, 
there was a reasonable suspicion the occupants 
of the car were engaged in a drug transaction—
the police had reliable information of criminal 
activity in the park and their observations of the 
youth were sufficient to meet the threshold for 
a valid detention. Justice Low stated: 
 
As required by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in R. v. Mann…the constables had reasonable 
grounds to briefly detain [the accused] and 
the others for the purposes of investigating 
these matters. While [the accused] was 
detained, [the officer] found the Youth’s 
Marihuana, confirming his suspicions that an 
illegal drug transaction had taken place. 
According to [the officer], he believed at this 
point he had grounds to arrest [the accused], 
the youth and [the accused’s] passenger. 
However, he did not arrest anyone; he only 
advised all present they were detained for an 
investigation under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act. 
 
A reasonable person looking objectively at the 
circumstances to this point would conclude 
that [the officer] had probable cause to 
believe an offence contrary to the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act had occurred. I 
have concluded [the officer] did not act 
arbitrarily at this point. He had reasonable 
grounds to continue the detention of [the 
accused] and the others. 
 
When [the accused] protested his detention, 
[the officers] placed him in handcuffs to 
secure their safety. I have concluded that 
[the officer] acted reasonably under the 
circumstances in doing so. Once [the officer] 
was told by the youth a drug sale had taken 
place in the car, he believed someone in the 
car had committed the offence of trafficking 
in illegal drugs.  
 
Considering all of the circumstances leading up 
to the search, and in particular the admission 
by the youth, [the officer] objectively had 
reasonable and proper grounds for this belief. 
However, [the officer] did not know whether 
to arrest [the accused] or his passenger for 
trafficking. [The officer] decided to search 
the car to see if he could determine 
 Volume 5 Issue 2             www.jibc.bc.ca 
March/April 2005 
27
specifically who should be arrested. After 
searching the car and finding the evidence in 
question, [the officer] arrested [the accused] 
for trafficking marihuana and advised him of 
his right to counsel. As a result, I have 
concluded that the search of [the accused’s] 
car was incidental to an arrest and therefore 
the evidence in question is admissible. [paras. 
12-15, references omitted] 
 
The evidence seized from the car was 
admissible.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
LAWFUL DETENTION 
UNDERMINED BY 
UNREASONABLE SEARCH 
R. v. Byfield, 
(2005) Docket:C39794 (OntCA) 
 
Two plainclothes police officers 
saw a woman believed to be 
working as a prostitute get into 
a van and return to the area 10 
minutes later. She then entered 
a nearby variety store, was seen near a 
telephone, left five minutes later, and was 
picked up by a car. The officers knew it was not 
uncommon for prostitutes to buy drugs with the 
money made after turning a trick. They followed 
the car and learned it was not registered in the 
area and that the registered driver was facing 
criminal charges. The car was also speeding.  
 
The police pulled over the car, which stopped 
abruptly. The accused got out and approached 
the officers. He was told he was stopped for 
speeding and was ordered to produce his license, 
ownership papers, and insurance. He was nervous 
and fidgety. Noting a bulge in his front pocket, 
the officer touched the accused’s crotch area, 
and felt something in the front of his pants. 
When asked what was in his pocket, the accused 
removed a bundle of money. The officer told the 
accused he could put it back, asking what else he 
had in his crotch area. At that point the accused 
fled and threw a plastic bag containing crack 
cocaine. He was tackled and arrested and 
charged with possession of cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking and possession of crime 
proceeds.  
 
At trial in the Superior Court of Justice the 
Crown conceded that the search was 
unreasonable because the officer touched the 
accused’s crotch area for reasons unrelated to 
officer safety. Rather, he did so to investigate 
whether the accused was carrying any 
contraband. The accused also argued that he had 
been arbitrarily detained contrary to s.9 of the 
Charter. However, Justice Dyson concluded that 
the stop was not arbitrary.  
 
Without finding the stop related to highway 
regulation and safety purposes (speeding), he 
ruled that the officers reasonably suspected the 
accused was involved in drug trafficking based 
upon their experience and observations of the 
suspected prostitute. Despite the Crown’s 
concession on the s.8 issue, he nonetheless 
admitted the evidence under s.24(2). In his view, 
its admission would not affect trial fairness, the 
violation was minor, and the officers acted in 
good faith. Furthermore, the securing of the 
evidence and the breach were too remote to 
warrant exclusion. Exclusion of the evidence, not 
its admission, would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. The accused was 
convicted. 
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal. Justice Rosenberg, writing the 
unanimous judgment, allowed the appeal but 
found the detention itself lawful. In R. v. Mann, 
2004 SCC 52, the Supreme Court of Canada 
ruled that the police have the common law power 
to detain persons encountered on the street if 
they have reasonable grounds to detain them, a 
threshold lower than reasonable grounds for 
arrest. In terms of this case, Justice Rosenberg 
stated: 
 
On the trial judge's findings, the police did not 
stop the [accused] based merely upon a hunch 
 28            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 5 Issue 2 
  March/April 2005 
or intuition based on experience, nor merely 
because he was in a high-crime area…The 
officers were able to articulate the basis for 
their suspicion and provide a demonstrable 
rationale that the driver of the vehicle had 
engaged in a particular crime, namely drug 
trafficking…The officers offered objective 
grounds for their suspicions that cannot be 
dismissed simply as neutral facts. Their 
conclusion that the woman was a prostitute is 
consistent with the facts. The subsequent 
interpretation of her behaviour as indicating 
that the driver of the Honda was likely a drug 
dealer is somewhat more problematic. The 
behaviour was, however, unusual and the 
officers' interpretation seems neither 
unreasonable nor based solely on hunches, 
speculation and guesses…That said, I would 
characterize this as a close case since the 
reasonableness of the officers' suspicion rests 
so heavily on their experience and the basis of 
that experience was not well demonstrated at 
trial. [para. 20] 
 
However, a detention that is lawful at its 
inception may be undermined if the police 
exercise the power unreasonably. During an 
investigative detention, the police are only 
entitled to conduct a pat down search of the 
detainee if the officer believes on reasonable 
grounds that their safety, or the safety of 
others, is at risk—the search power does not 
exist as a matter of course. In this case, as 
Justice Rosenberg found, “there is no 
suggestion…that the initial search near the 
[accused’s] groin area was motivated by officer 
safety.” 
 
Admissibility of Evidence 
 
The appeal court ruled that the trial judge erred 
in admitting the evidence. Touching the accused 
near his groin could not be properly 
characterized as a minor violation and “the 
courts must take seriously the violation of a 
suspect’s rights in the course of an investigative 
stop.” There was both a close temporal and 
casual connection between the breach and the 
securing of the evidence. The stop, detention, 
and questioning of the accused resulted in the 
evidence being discovered. It was one 
transaction, taking a matter of minutes, with no 
intervening events. Moreover, Justice Rosenberg 
held: 
 
This was an intrusive search of the person in 
circumstances without legal justification. 
While the officers had reasonable grounds to 
detain the [accused], they did not have 
reasonable grounds to arrest or search at the 
time of the initial search by the first officer 
and the search was not justified for the 
purpose of officer protection. [para. 28] 
 
As for the good faith of the police in this case, 
it could not be claimed “on the basis of a police 
officer’s unreasonable error or ignorance as to 
the scope of their authority. “ 
 
In balancing the seriousness of the breach 
against the affect of exclusion, the appeal court 
ruled the evidence should not have been 
admitted. The appeal was allowed, the 
convictions set aside, and the accused was 
acquitted.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
DID YOU KNOW? 
 
…that in 2003/2004 British Columbia had the 
highest percentage of adult criminal cases in 
Canada that resulted in a bench warrant at 
24.2%8.  Alberta was second at 21.3 %, while 
Prince Edward Island had the lowest percentage 
of bench warrants at only 6.9%. 
                                                 
8 Source: Statistics Canada Juristat, Catalogue no. 85-002-XPE, Vol. 24, no. 12. 
Statistics for Manitoba, North West Territories and Nunavut were not reported. 
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COMPARING CRIME IN YOUR 
COMMUNITY 
 
Have you ever considered 
how your community’s crime 
rate statistically compares 
to other areas, be it the 
provincial, national or 
United States (US) 
average? For this article, the Abbotsford Census 
Metropolitan Area9 (CMA), one of Statistics 
Canada’s 27 defined geographic areas with a 
population in excess of 100,000, was chosen for 
comparison.  The Abbotsford CMA is located in 
British Columbia’s (BC) Fraser Valley, east of 
Vancouver. All US statistics were obtained from 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “Crime in 
the United States 2003” report while Canadian 
statistics were obtained from Statistics 
Canada’s “Juristat: Canadian Crime Statistics, 
2003, Vol. 24, no. 6”. Four crime rates—
homicide, break and enter, motor vehicle theft, 
and robbery—were chosen for comparison10. 
 
Homicide  
 
The US murder and non-negligent manslaughter 
rate was 5.7 “per 100,000 inhabitants.” In 
Canada, the homicide rate “per 100,000 
population” was 1.7.  
 
In BC, the rate was higher than the Canadian 
average at 2.2. Abbotsford was the highest in 
Canada at 5.1 (equal only to Regina), which was 
2.21.7
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9 Police Services included in the Abbotsford CMA are Abbotsford and Mission 
(RCMP) 
10 Available 2003 statistics were used. 
higher than that of 28 US states, including 
Colorado, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Jersey, New 
York, Oregon, and Washington.  
 
Break & Enter  
 
In the US, the crime of break and enter is 
known as burglary. The US rate was 741 
burglaries per 100,000 inhabitants. In Canada, 
the average was 900 per 100,000 population and 
even higher in BC with a rate of 1,277, which is 
higher than all 50 US states.  In Abbotsford the 
break and enter rate increases to 1,335 per 
100,000. 
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Motor Vehicle Theft 
 
The US motor vehicle theft rate was 433 per 
100,000 inhabitants, while in Canada that rate 
increases to 541. The BC rate is higher still, at 
958. Only the state of Arizona and the District 
of Columbia have higher motor vehicle theft 
rates than BC. Abbotsford’s motor vehicle theft 
rate was the highest in the nation at 1,580, 
which by comparison is more than three times 
the US rate. 
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Robbery 
 
There were 142 robbery crimes per 100,000 
inhabitants in the US compared to a rate of 90 
in Canada. BC had a rate of 107, higher than the 
Canadian average, while Abbotsford was even 
higher at 114.  
But how does Abbotsford’s crime rate compare 
to BC’s other two CMAs—Victoria11 and 
Vancouver12.  
 
Total Crime Rate 
 
The total crime rate (including violent, property, 
and other crimes) for Canada, on average, was 
8,132 per 100,000 people. The BC average was 
12,372. Both Victoria (10,588) and Vancouver 
(11,576) were above the Canadian average but 
below BC’s. Abbotsford (13,356), on the other 
                                                 
11 Police Services included in the Victoria CMA are Central Saanich, Colwood 
(RCMP), Langford (RCMP), North Saanich D.M. (RCMP), Oak Bay, Saanich, Sidney 
(RCMP), Sooke (RCMP), Victoria, View Royal (RCMP), and West Shore (RCMP). 
12 Police Services included in the Vancouver CMA are Bowen Island (RCMP rural), 
Burnaby (RCMP), Coquitlam (RCMP), Delta, Langley(RCMP), Maple Ridge (RCMP) 
New Westminster, North Vancouver (RCMP), Pitt Meadows (RCMP), Port 
Coquitlam (RCMP), Port Moody, Richmond (RCMP), Squamish (RCMP), Surrey 
(RCMP), Vancouver, West Vancouver, and White Rock (RCMP).  
 
hand, exceeded both the Canadian and provincial 
average.  
 
Violent Crime Rate 
 
Violent crime—including homicide, attempted 
murder, assault, sexual assault, and robbery—
had a rate in Canada of 963 offences per 
100,000. The provincial average was 1,206 
offences per 100,000 and all three of  BC’s 
CMA’s had violent crime rates above the national 
rate but below the provincial rate—Victoria 
(1,136), Vancouver (1,028), and Abbotsford 
(1,163). 
Property Crime Rate 
 
The property crime rate—including break and 
enter, motor vehicle theft, theft, possession of 
stolen goods, and fraud—was 4,121 offences per 
100,000 people nationally. In BC the rate rose to 
6,922. Victoria (5,549) was BC’s only CMA with a 
property crime rate below the provincial average. 
Vancouver (7,310) and Abbotsford (7,927) 
exceeded both the BC and Canadian rate.  
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Other Crime Rate 
 
Other crimes—such as mischief, counterfeiting 
currency, bail violations, offensive weapons, 
prostitution, and arson—had a rate across 
Canada of 3,048 offences per 100,000. BC’s 
average rose to 4,244, while Abbotsford’s rose 
even higher to 4,266. Both Victoria and 
Vancouver were higher than Canada’s average, 
but lower than BC’s.  
Police Officer Strengths 
 
How does the number of police officers per 
population compare across these same 
geographic regions? Across Canada there are on 
average 188 police officers per 100,000 people13. 
In BC this rate drops to 171 officers per 
100,000. In all three BC CMA’s, this rate drops 
further—Victoria (149) and Vancouver (142). 
Abbotsford had the lowest police officer per 
population ratio in the nation at 129 officers per 
100,000.  
 
 
                                                 
13 2004 statistics. Source: Police Resources in Canada, 2004 (85-225-XIE). 
Another method of demonstrating police 
strength is population per police officer. In 
Canada, the rate is 533 residents to every 
officer. In BC that rate rises to 583 residents 
per officer. Victoria (668) and Vancouver (704) 
are even higher with Abbotsford (777) the 
highest in the nation of all 27 CMAs. 
If you would like to compare your community, 
these and other statistics are available from 
Statistics Canada or visit the JIBC Library to 
access these reports. 
 
2006 POLICE LEADERSHIP 
CONFERENCE 
APRIL 10-12, 2006  
 
Mark your calendar! The British 
Columbia Association of Chief's 
of Police, the Ministry of Public 
Safety and Solicitor General and 
the Justice Institute of British 
Columbia will be hosting the 
"Police Leadership 2006 Conference" April 10 
to 12, 2006 at the Westin Bayshore in 
Vancouver, British Columbia. This is Canada’s 
largest Police Leadership Conference and was 
sold out in 2004.  
 
This conference will emphasize leadership as an 
activity, not a position, and provide an 
opportunity for participants of all ranks from 
police agencies across Canada, the United 
States, and beyond to engage with a carefully 
chosen list of first class speakers. Visit the 
JIBC Police Academy website at www.jibc.bc.ca 
for more information. 
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Call for Instructors    April 2005 
Law Enforcement and Regulatory Training 
Contact Us 
www.jibc.bc.ca/police 
 
Phone: 604.528.5753 
Fax: 604.528.5754 
 
Justice Institute of BC 
715 McBride Blvd 
New Westminster, BC 
V3L 5T4 
 
Registration 
Greater Vancouver: 
604.528.5590  
 
Outside Greater Vancouver: 
1.877.528.5591 
 
email: register@jibc.bc.ca 
 
Customized Training in 
Your Workplace 
All of our courses and 
programs can be customized 
for delivery in your workplace 
or community. 
 
 
Within the Police Academy, Law Enforcement and Regulatory 
Training Programs provides a wide range of training and 
development opportunities for public and private sector 
organizations, as well as individuals working in the fields of 
inspections, investigations, enforcement, security and regulatory 
compliance. 
 
We are currently looking for instructors to teach in our 
Investigation and Enforcement Skills Certificate Program in the 
following content areas: 
 
Legal Studies: 
• Criminal Law 
• Administrative Law 
• Search and Seizure 
 
General Investigative Skills 
Report Writing 
 
Qualifications: 
• Current teaching experience considered an asset 
• Current or previous law enforcement experience  
• Two references 
 
Successful candidates will be asked to attend an interview and 
provide a 10 minute presentation on a topic of their choice. 
 
If you are interested, please forward a copy of your resume, 
indicating the content areas of interest, by email to 
jamos@jibc.bc.ca 
 
For more information on the Investigation and Enforcement Skills 
Certificate Program, please go to www.jibc.bc.ca/police 
 
